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UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Uniform Commercial Code-BREACH OF WARRANTY-APPLICABLE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR PERSONAL INJuRY-Tyler v. Street
Statutes of limitation are statutes of repose, the object of which is
to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time.
They are designed to suppress fraudulent and stale claims from being
asserted after a great lapse of time, to the surprise of the parties, when
the evidence may have been lost, the facts may have become obscure
because of defective memory, or the witnesses have died or dis-
appeared.'
Prior to the adoption in Virginia of the Uniform Commercial Code2
with its four year statute of limitations, a two year statute3 was held
applicable to actions for personal injury based on breach of common
law warranty,4 a contract action, and also to actions based on negli-
I Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 195
Va. 827, 839, 80 S.E.2d 574, 581 (1954).
2 VA. CoDE ANN. § 8.10-101 (1965) prescribes January 1, 1966 as the effective date of
Uniform Commercial Code in Virginia.
a VA. CoD ANN. § 8-24 (1957) provides in part that:
Every action for personal injuries shall be brought within two years next after
the right to bring the same shall have accrued.
4See Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969); Friedman v.
Peoples Serv. Drug Stores, Inc., 208 Va. 700, 160 S.E.2d 563 (1968). The Caudill case
involved an action for personal injuries resulting from breach of the common law
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Though the injury occurred after
the effective date of the Uniform Commercial Code, the sale did not. Therefore the
U.C.C. did not apply and the court decided the case upon common law principles. The
court in holding Va. Code Ann. § 8-24 (1957) to be applicable stated:
Obviously, since the plaintiff had not been injured at the time she purchased
the car, she could not then maintain an action for her injuries. To say, then,
that her right of action accrued before her injuries were received is to say that
she was without remedy to recover damages for her alleged injuries. 210 Va. at
12-13.
The logic of the court fails here. In a negligence action to recover for personal
injuries in Virginia, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time the injury occurs
regardless of the fact that the plaintiff may not have discovered his injury until after
the two year period has elapsed. See, e.g., Hawks v. DeHart, 206 Va. 810, 146 S.E.2d
187 (1966). Under U.C.C. warranties, the breach occurs at tender of delivery, at which
time the statute of limitations commences to run. Breach of a Code warranty gives
rise to a cause of action regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the
breach. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-725(2) (1965). Personal injury resulting from breach of
warranty under the U.C.C. is only a consequential damage of the original breach. See
VA. CoDE ANN. § 8.2-715(2) (b) (1965). This personal injury is only evidence of the
breach which occurred at tender of delivery (or upon acceptance if future performance
is expressly required). In light of the fact that the Virginia court will bar an action for
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gence,r a tort action. In warranty the cause of action accrues at the time
of the breach, 6 while in negligence it accrues at the time of injury.' In
the five years since the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code by
Virginia, the Supreme Court of Virginia has not yet had the occasion
to determine which statute of limitations is applicable in an action for
breach of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code to recover
for personal injury. However, in Tyler v. Street,' the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia recently anticipated
what the Supreme Court of Virginia would decide in this situation.
In Tyler the plaintiffs allegedly sustained injuries by the inhalation of
personal injuries caused by negligence, even though the injuries are not discovered
until after two years had passed, and in light of the fact that an action for property
damages from breach of warranty, due to a defect which does not evidence itself until
after four years from tender of delivery, is also barred; then it follows that recovery
for personal injuries resulting from this same defect which are not evidenced until after
the period of limitations has elapsed, should also be barred. If the Virginia Supreme
Court had not professed the rule stated in Hawkes v. DeHart (that the cause of action
accrues at the time of injury even if unknown), but had instead adopted the "discovery"
rule as stated in Morgan v. Grace Hospital, Inc., 149 W.Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965)
(that the period of limitations begins to run when the injury is or should have been
discovered), there would be some justification in applying the two year statute to all
personal injury actions based on warranty. However, since Virginia takes the view
that in personal injury actions the period of limitations begins to run when the wrong-
ful act is done rather than when the damage occurs or the wrongful act is discovered,
then the four year statute of limitations commencing at tender of delivery should be
applied in a personal injury action based on breach of warranty. It seems illogical that
a plaintiff, suing on the basis of breach of warranty, should be barred after four years
from recovery of economic loss due to an existing defect in the goods but allowed
to recover for his personal injuries resulting from that defect because a different statute
of limitations (two years) is held to apply and runs from a different point in time.
See Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 417 Pa. 107, 207 A.2d 823 (1965), applying the U.C.C.
four ycar statute of limitations in an action for breach of warranty to recover for
personal injury. The court held that the statute began to run from the time of sale
and not the time of injury. See also Hodge v. Service Mach. Co., 314 F. Supp. 707
(E.D. Tenn. 1970); Armor., 17 A.L.R.3d 1010, § 60(c) (1968). The court in Hodge
held that since the breach had occurred at the time of sale (tender of delivery), rather
than at the time of injury, the statute of limitations had lapsed and an action in warranty
to recover for personal injury was barred. The fact that the action was barred before
the injury occurred did not unconstitutionally deprive the plaintiff of a cause of action.
5 See Barnes v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 406 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1969); Sides v. Richard
Mach. Works, Inc., 406 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1969).
6See VA. CODE Am¢. § 8.2-725 (1965). But see Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210
Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969); Friedman v. Peoples Ser. Drug Stores, Inc, 208 Va. 700,
160 S.E.2d 563 (1968).
7 See cases cited note 5 supra.
8 322 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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fumes emitted from a product manufactured by the defendantsY The
plaintiffs' action to recover for personal injuries for breach of a Uniform
Commercial Code warranty 0 was brought more than two years after
the alleged initial injuries." The court held that the two year statute of
limitations for personal injury 2 was the applicable statute 3 rather than
the more recently enacted four year statute of limitations, which the
Uniform Commercial Code provides for breach of warranty.14 The
Tyler court reasoned that since the two year statute had been applied
to actions for breach of common law warranty to recover for personal
injury,15 arising prior to the effective date of the Uniform Commercial
Code, it should also be applied to actions for breach of a Code warranty
resulting in personal injury.16
It should be noted that the court was not hard pressed to allow re-
covery in warranty in the present case. It recognized that, based on
the doctrine of continuing negligence, 7 the plaintiffs might recover for
subsequent personal injuries arising within the period of limitations.
Though the decision reached in Tyler may seem at first blush to be
indicative of what the Supreme Court of Virginia would have held on
9 Id. at 542. Lack of a contractual or business relationship between the plaintiff and
the defendant in warranty is of no consequence in Virginia due to the adoption of a
very liberal anti-privity statute. See VA. CODE ANr. § 8.2-318 (1965).
10 322 F. Supp. at 542.
11 Id. at 542. The sale, as well as the injuries, occurred after the effective date of
the U.C.C., therefore making the U.C.C. applicable here. whereas it was inapplicable
in Caudill.
12 See note 3 supra.
13 322 F. Supp. at 543.
14 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-725. The applicable provisions are as follows:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within
four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the
parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may
not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the ag-
grieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs
when tender of delivery is made, except where a warranty explicitly extends to
future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the
time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or
should have been discovered.
15 See Tyler v. Street, 322 F. Supp. 541, 543 (E.D. Va. 1971); Friedman v. Peoples
Serv. Drug Stores, Inc., 208 Va. 700, 160 S.E.2d 563 (1968).
16 322 F. Supp. at 543.
17 Id. at 544. See Sides v. Richard Mach. Works, Inc, 406 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1969)
commented on in 4 U. RICH. L. REv. 148 (1969).
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the same facts, it is contrary to the overall purposes:8 and express pro-
visions of the Uniform Commercial Code.'19
The Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted in Virginia, establishes a
cause of action for breach of warranty 0 and allows recovery for both
incidental and consequential damages resulting from the breach." Con-
sequential damages expressly include personal injury.2  The Code
further provides a four year statute of limitations applicable to this cause
of action?23 Its purpose is to eliminate jurisdictional variations, by in-
troducing a uniform period of limitations into the area of sales dealt with
in Article II of the Code.24 In light of modern business practices, four
years was selected as an appropriate period within which to bring an
action.25 The cause of action for breach of warranty to recover for
personal injury under the Uniform Commercial Code is only a narrow
segment carved out of the broad field of personal injury actions26 to
which the two year personal injury statute has been applied.27 Since the
Code provisions applicable to breach of warranty were enacted more
recently than the two year statute,28 they should be held to supersede
it in the limited area9 of breach of warranty, whether to recover dam-
ages for injury to persons or property. Otherwise, the purposes and ex-
press provisions of the Code in this area will not be effected.
Is The underlying purposes of the U.C.C. are to simplify, clarify and modernize the
law which governs commercial transactions and to make uniform the laws among the
various jurisdictions. VA. CODE AnN. § 8.1-102 (1965). The purpose of VA. CoDE ANN.
§ 8.2-725 (1965) is to introduce a uniform statute of limitations for sales contracts,
thereby eliminating jurisdictional variations. In this way business concerns doing busi-
ness in several jurisdictions will not have their commercial transactions frustrated by
unanticipated variations in the applicable law.
19 See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-725 (1965); note 26 infra.
2o See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.2-312 through 315 (1965).
21 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-715 (1965).
22 VA. CODE ANN. 9 8.2-715 (2)b (1965).
23 VA. CODE ANN. 8.2-725(1) (1965).
24 See note 18 supra.
25 See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-725 (1965), Comment.
26 The four year statute of limitations for breach of warranty is only applicable in
the area of sales covered by Article II of the U.C.C. VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-24 (1957)
would still apply in all situations involving personal injury which are not based upon
a theory of breach of warranty.
27 See, e.g., Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969); Friedman
v. Peoples Serv. Drug Stores, Inc., 208 Va. 700, 160 S.E.2d 563 (1968).
2 8s See Va. Acts of Assembly 1964, ch. 219, at 293 (Virginia legislature adopting the
Uniform Commercial Code).
29 Cf. In re Smith, 311 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Va. 1970), aff'd mem. sub nom., Callaghan
v. Commercial Credit Corp., 437 F.2d 898 (4th Cir. 1971).
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Furthermore, the Code provides in Article X that all acts and parts
of acts are repealed to the extent that they are inconsistent with the
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.30 It is clear that the two
year personal injury statute conflicts with the four year statute of limita-
dons provided in the Code. Either period might be applied to an action
for breach of a code warranty to recover for personal injury. Therefore,
the two year statute should be repealed insofar as it is inconsistent.31
The statute of limitations for contract actions in general3a was con-
strued in Friedman v. Peoples Service Drug Stores, Inc.3 3 not to be
applicable to an action for breach of common law warranty to recover
for personal injury. The 1964 amendment to this statute, which was
enacted simultaneously with the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 pro-
vides that where the Code four year statute of limitations is applicable,
the four year statute should be controlling.3 5 This amendment, along
with the general repealer in Article X of the Code,3 6 requires the con-
clusion that the Code four year statute should supersede the previous
state law3 7 in its applicable area.
Pennsylvania has decided the same question in their state as presented
by the facts of the Tyler case. There, the Uniform Commercial Code
four year statute of limitations was held to be controlling rather than
previous state authority that had applied a two year personal injury
statute in actions for breach of warranty. 8
30 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.10-103 (1965). This section states:
Except as provided in the following section, all acts and parts of acts inconsistent
with this act are hereby repealed.
The exception referred to is applicable only to Article VII concerning documents of
title. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.10-104 (1965).
31 See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.10-103 (1965).
32 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-13 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
33 208 Va. 700, 160 S.E.2d 563 (1968).
34See Va. Acts of Assembly 1964, ch. 219, at 411, amended in Va. Acts of Assembly
1966, ch. 118, 215, to correctly specify the number of the code section previously in-
tended.
35 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-13 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
86 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.10:103 (1965).
.
3 7 VA. CODEANN. § 8-24 (1957).
S8See Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 417 Pa. 107, 207 A.2d 823 (1965); Gardiner v.
Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964); Engelman v. Eastern Light
Co, 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 38 (Com. P1. 1962). See also Hoeflich v. W. S. Merrell Co,
288 F. Supp. 659 (ED. Pa. 1968); Matlack, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 972
(E.D. Pa. 1966) (both ixecognizing the Pennsylvania rule); Bort v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co, .58 Misc. 2d 889, 296 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1969); Layman v. Keller Ladders, Inc., - Tenn.
-,-.455 S.W.2d 594 (1970) (all applying the four year U.C.C. statute to a breach of
[Vol. 6:167
RECENT DECISIONS
The consequences of applying the two year statute or the four year
statute in a given situation are significant. In applying the two year
personal injury statute, 9 which begins to'run at the time of injury,4°
the cause of action may not accrue until an indefinite number of years
after receipt of the goods.& 41 By contrast, the Code's four year statute
begins to run at the time of the breach, that is, upon tender of delivery,42
and so the time of injury is completely immaterial. Therefore, in a ten-
der of delivery situation there exists a maximum of four years during
which an action for breach of warranty may be brought.4 3 This being
true, a plaintiff should give consideration to the date of tender of de-
livery for purposes of a remedy in warranty, while for purposes of a
remedy in negligence, the date of injury should be noted. The obvious
consequence is that either an action for negligence or one for breach of
warranty may be barred while the other remains available to the plain-
tiff.4
warranty action to recover for personal injury. Cf. International Union of Operating
Eng'rs v. Chrysler Motors Corp., - R.I. -, 258 A.2d 271 (1969), in which the court
refused to apply the four year U.C.C. statute of limitations because there was no
contractual relationship between the parties. Lack of privity is not a defense in Virginia
since a liberal anti-privity statute has been adopted. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318
(1965). Contra, Abate v. Bankers of Wallingford, Inc., 27 Conn. Supp. 46, 229 A.2d
366 (1967). See generally Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 1010, 1145 (1968).
3 9 VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-24 (1957).
40 See Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 168 SE.2d 257 (1969).
41 A retailer or manufacturer would be potentially liable in warranty for injuries
caused by a defect in the goods for an indefinite period. In many instances there would
be no practical limitation on an action since the injury might not occur for twenty,
thirty or more years after the sale.
42 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-725(2) (1965). It should be noted that where the warranty
explicity extends to future performance and discovery of the breach must await the
time of such performance, the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should
have been discovered.
43 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-725 (1965). Since the cause of action accrues at the time
of the breach, normally at tender of delivery, if evidence of the breach-failure of the
goods to conform or personal injuries-is not found to have occurred within four years
of the sale, then the plaintiff is precluded from recovery under the U.C.C, on the basis
of breach of warranty. He must prove negligence and recover for personal injuries
in tort, unless, of course, two years have expired since the time of injury, thereby
barring his remedy on that theory also.
44 If the injury occurred three years from the time of sale, the plaintiff would have
a possible remedy in warranty (four years having not yet elapsed), and possibly a
remedy based on negligence (two years from the time of injury). But if the injury
occurs five years after the sale, a remedy in warranty is barred While one in negligence
remains. Where the plaintiff is unknowingly injured on the day of the sale and three
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In the area of personal injury, where liability has become increasingly
strict-moving from negligence 5 into the realm of warranty,46 into strict
products liability47 and tomorrow, perhaps, into liability without fault in
all areas, is it more desirable to leave indefinitely long the period before
which an action is barred48 or to establish a definite limit?40 The applica-
tion of the two year statute by the Tyler court, in a breach of war-
ranty action to recover for personal injury, extends a merchant's or
manufacturer's potential period of liability for an indefinite length of
time.50 The Uniform Commercial Code's attempt to establish a definite
limit on the period of liability for breach of warranty is the better
solution 1
M. E. B.
years pass before he discovers the injury, he is barred from recovery based on negli-
gence, while a remedy in warranty remains available.
45 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
46 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.2-312 thru -315 (1965).
47See, e.g., Emroch, Caveat Emptor to Strict Liability: One Hundred Years of
Products Liability Law, 4 U. RicH. L. REv. 155 (1970).
4s See note 41 supra.
49See VA. CoDE ANN. § 8.2-725 (1965), which sets such a definite limit.
50 See note 41 supra.
51The remaining inquiry is whether or not four years given by the U.C.C. is a
reasonable period of time. Perhaps it would be better to leave definite the length of
time, but make it longer. The authors of the U.C.C. felt that four years was a com-
mercially reasonable time commensurate with modem business practice and record
keeping.
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